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1. Introduction
East-West trade is increasingly dominated by countertrade [1]. In its
simplest form, countertrade means bartering one product for another. In its
most complex form, countertrade can be a disguised form of direct capitalist
investment in socialist countries; the Western firm provides the capital and
expertise to build and run a new plant and gets in return a share of the plant's
output.
In all its aspects, countertrade now spurs hundreds of millions of dollars in
U.S. imports every year [2]. In the European Community (the "EC"), yearly
countertrade imports are worth billions [3]. As these imports begin to make
themselves felt in the marketplace, domestic industries faced with new compe-
tition are starting to seek relief, largely in their countries' trade laws. At the
same time, U.S. companies engaged in countertrade have become uneasy as
their large investments in long-term agreements are placed at risk by these
same laws. How to apply the trade laws to countertrade is a question that
lawyers, scholars, and government officials have only begun to consider. This
article offers a survey of the applicable laws and a preliminary analysis of the
issues likely to arise as countertrade moves from the bargaining table to the
courts.
2. GATT
Any discussion of the legal constraints on East-West countertrade logically
begins with the international regime established by the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (the "GATI"). The GATT is the closest thing the world has
to an international law of trade. We will discuss the GATT only briefly.
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however, both because it is covered elsewhere in this issue [4] and because as a
practical matter the GATT does little to regulate countertrade demands.
The GATT is a multilateral agreement designed to liberalize trade, first, by
requiring that nations rely only on tariffs to provide trade protection and.
second, by providing for the negotiation of gradual reductions in those tariffs
[5]. The GATT's effectiveness in the context of countertrade, however, is
limited at the outset by the small number of Communist countries that have
joined the agreement. The Soviet Union is not a contracting party, nor are
many of the Eastern European countries. Nonetheless, countries with state-
controlled economies are showing a new interest in joining the GATT. For
years, the only state-controlled economies belonging to the GATT were
countries that joined before adopting central planning - such as Cuba and
Czechoslovakia. Now several others, including Romania, Hungary, and Po-
land, have recently acceded to the GATT.
While these accessions have prompted new efforts to adapt the GATT to
East-West trade, the adjustment has been awkward at best. Some provisions
seem readily adaptable, particularly those dealing with state-owned enterprises
or state monopolies and monopsonies in particular product lines. Article XVII:
l(a) of the GATT requires that state enterprises treat imports and exports "in
a manner consistent with the general principles of non-discriminatory treat-
ment prescribed in this Agreement for governmental measures affecting im-
ports or exports by private traders". This provision incorporates the "national
treatment" principle in Article III: "[L]aws, regulations and requirements
affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribu-
tion or use of products... should not be applied to imported or domestic
products so as to afford protection to domestic production" [6]. This principle,
as elaborated by other parts of Article III [7], would appear to limit counter-
trade requirements even when imposed by commercial enterprises controlled
by the state; the only exception is for government agencies procuring products
"for governmental purposes and not with a view to commercial resale or with a
view to use in the production of goods for commercial sale" [8].
These provisions seem designed to require that state-controlled enterprises
accept the broad duties the GATT imposes on states. This design is made
explicit with respect to quotas and other quantitative restrictions. These trade
barriers are covered by Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, and XVIII, and an
interpretative note states that "[t]hroughout [these articles] the terms 'import
restrictions' or 'export restrictions' include restrictions made effective through
state-trading operations" [9].
While these provisions block an obvious loophole by which the require-
ments of the GATT could be evaded, they do not deal with the more difficult
problems caused by state-owned enterprises. These enterprises, whether operat-
ing in a market environment or as part of a state-controlled economy, are in a
position to engage in subtle forms of discrimination either against all imports
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or against particular trading partners. The only effort to deal with this
possibility on a general level may be found in Article II: 4, which requires any
contracting party with an import monopoly not to use the monopoly "so as to
afford protection on the average in excess of the amount of protection
provided" by its GATT tariff schedule. The precise meaning of this language
(and its almost wholly opaque interpretative note) may never be known, but it
presumably requires state import monopolies not to resell imported goods at a
monopoly premium that is higher than the applicable tariff. Whatever protec-
tion it may offer in a mixed economy, this GATT rule is plainly unenforceable
in centrally planned economies that may create shortages without raising
prices.
In fact, the accession protocols negotiated with Romania, Hungary, and
Poland suggest that GATT members have despaired of calculating "tariff
equivalencies" for centrally planned economies. The protocols do not establish
tariff schedules for these countries - a critical omission given the overarching
GATT policy of eliminating all trade barriers other than tariffs. Instead of
creating schedules for nonmarket economies ("NMEs") and then reducing
those tariffs, the protocols focus simply on increasing the volume of these
countries' imports from GATT members, evidently assuming that increasing
volume is the best proof that trade barriers are being lowered.
This simplistic approach to East-West trade liberalization may have a
substantial impact on the analysis of countertrade as an import barrier. There
is little doubt that countertrade can be abused. If, as appears to be the case.
countertrade is more often demanded in dealings with companies from devel-
oped Western nations, the practice may violate the nondiscrimination require-
ment that the GATT specifically imposes on state trading companies. If
countertrade is demanded more frequently in connection with certain products
(e.g. capital goods, high-technology items, or luxuries), the practice may be
viewed as a GATT-proscribed quota on the affected products.
The difficulty with carrying this analysis further is that the accession
protocols, by abandoning the effort to create NME tariff schedules, seem to
accept even blatant restrictions on imports by countries with state-controlled
economies, as long as the total volume of imports continues to increase at a
satisfactory rate. Thus, Romania may well be free to demand countertrade in
its trade with the West, and not in its trade with the Soviet Union, as long as it
continues to "increase its imports from [GATT members] as a whole at a rate
not smaller than the growth of Romanian imports provided for in its Five-Year
Plans" [10]. By the same token, Poland may violate no GAIT provision when
it demands higher countertrade percentages for luxury goods than for in-
dustrial equipment, as long as it continues "to increase to total value of its
imports from [GATT members] by not less than seven percent per annum"
[11].
While this result is repugnant to the spirit of the GATT, it may be the only
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practicable one. Unless GATT members are willing to search out and proscribe
all of the countless subtle ways by which a state-controlled economy can
-discriminate against particular countries or can limit particular classes of
imports, it makes little sense to attack countertrade on the ground that it may
be used for these purposes.
Finally, we do not mean to imply that such uses of countertrade would
always violate even the spirit of the GATT. Despite several rounds of tariff
reductions under the GATT, most countries still have tariff structures that
substantially favor certain imports over others (e.g. low or no tariffs on raw
materials and relatively high tariffs on manufactured luxuries). Moreover,
under the GATT, quantitative limitations may be imposed by members facing
a balance of payments squeeze [12] as well as by less-developed members (13].
In short, when countertrade is used as a way of producing a reasonable trade
balance with the West, which seems to be a primary raison d'atre, the GATT
offers few grounds for attack.
The upshot is that only national restrictions on countertrade are likely to
have much bite. As we shall see, the trade laws of both the United States and
the EC do impose special restrictions on East-West trade, although the exteni
to which these special measures deal effectively with the unique aspects of
countertrade is open to question.
3. National restrictions
Nonmarket economies that have not joined the GATT theoretically may be
the object of severely discriminatory trade measures. The U.S. tariff schedules,
for example, apply higher "column 2" duties to imports from socialist coun-
tries that have not established most-favored-nation ("MFN") trade relations
with the United States [14]. Generally, however, the special trade standards
applied by Western nations to NMEs do not distinguish very crisply between
those that have joined the GATT and those that have not. This is true both in
the United States and in the EC, not only in escape clause actions but also in
antidumping and countervailing duty actions.
3.1. Escape clause
Escape clause proceedings draw their name from Article XIX of the GATT,
which permits countries to suspend tariff concessions and other GATT obliga-
tions for particular products imported in "such increased quantities and under
conditions as to cause or threaten seriotis injury to domestic producers... of
like or directly competitive products". Exporting countries affected by such a
protective measure are licensed to retaliate by suspending "substantially
equivalent concessions".
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3.1.1. The United States Trade Act of 1974
3.1.1.1. Section 201. The United States has written the escape clause into
section 201 of its Act of 1974 (the "Trade Act") [15]. Section 201 requires the
U.S. International Trade Commission (the "ITC") to recommend import
restrictions, including quotas or tariffs, on goods imported "in such increased
quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury, or the threat thereof"
to a U.S. industry [16]. Perhaps because the escape clause is meant to be a
limited exception from the GATT (and certainly because its use invites
retaliation), relief under section 201 is subject to modification or nullification
by the President, whose action may in turn be overturned by a congressional
veto [ 171.
3.1.1.2. Section 406. When goods are imported from an NME, however.
section 201 is not the only source of relief. Section 406 of the Trade Act creates
a special escape clause that applies only to imports from a "Communist
country" [18]. Like section 201, section 406 requires the ITC to grant relief
when increased imports cause domestic injury. The standards for relief, how-
ever, are somewhat different. Instead of simply increasing, imports must be
"increasing rapidly, either absolutely or relatively" [19]. Instead of being a
substantial cause of serious injury, as under section 201, the imports need only
be "a significant cause of material injury, or threat thereof", to domestic
industry [20]. As with section 201, the ITC's recommendation for relief may be
overridden by the President, whose decision may be overruled by congressional
veto.
Section 406 has in fact been little used. At last count, only nine actions,
involving six products, had been brought under section 406, and no final relief
had been obtained in any of the proceedings [21]. One domestic industry,
clothespin manufacturing, eventually discovered that section 201 provided a
better vehicle for relief than section 406, largely because of the heavy di-
plomatic and political influences in East-West cases. In the clothespin case,
the President rejected the ITC's recommended section 406 relief against
Chinese imports, stating that he was doing so because of a pending section 201
investigation [22]. That investigation eventually produced a "global" quota
system that lumped Chinese clothespins together with other imports [23].
Apparently, U.S. relations with China made it more palatable to restrict
Chinese trade on such a "nondiscriminatory" basis.
Although the heavily political nature of section 406 has generally left
domestic complainants empty-handed, it is not without impact on trade with
NME nations. The danger of changing diplomatic winds and the expense of
defending a section 406 action can have a deterrent effect on countertrade
deals. These agreements, especially compensation arrangements, are frequently
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long-term, and they often require the Western partner to extend credit against
a pay-off to come years in the future.
There is no better example of the dangers that section 406 poses to
long-term countertrade than the ITC investigations of anhydrous ammonia
imported from the Soviet Union. The ammonia imports at issue were part of a
long-term fertilizer counterpurchase agreement entered into by Occidental and
the Soviet Union in 1973. Over a twenty-year period beginning in 1978.
Occidental was to export superphosphoric acid in return for an equivalent
value of ammonia, urea, and potash.
The deal was reviewed and approved by the U.S. government in 1973 and
endorsed by the President. Occidental took pains to avoid disrupting the
domestic market for ammonia. The agreement provided that the ammonia was
to be priced no lower than prevailing market prices. It also called for importing
steady quantities of ammonia, which were to increase over the first five years
and then level off. Over the life of the agreement, these quantities would never
exceed 10% of U.S. consumption and they would begin to decline as a
percentage of U.S. consumption in the middle 1980s.
In 1979, five years after the United States endorsed the agreement, but only
one year after Occidental began to get the benefit of its investment, a section
406 action was begun. In October of that year, the ITC recommended a
three-year quota [24). President Carter rejected that recommendation in De-
cember, deciding that import relief was not in the national economic interest
[25].
Only one month later, however, after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, the
President reversed his decision on the ground that recent events had altered
international economic conditions. He ordered a new ITC investigation and
imposed a one-year interim emergency quota on ammonia imports [26]. This
time, however, the ITC voted 3-2 that there was no injury from Soviet
imports, and it terminated the President's temporary quota [27]. The case was
over, but no one had won. Each side's legal fees were tremendous. The
domestic ammonia producers obtained no relief and Occidental saw its $20
billion trade agreement brought to the brink of dissolution twice in a single
year.
The President's change of heart in the ammonia case, and the more recent
Western reaction to events in Poland, shows how rapidly favored NME trading
partners can become virtual pariahs. The likelihood that such changes in
diplomatic relationships will translate into section 406 relief must enter into
the plans of any U.S. company contemplating an extended countertrade
agreement.
3.1.2. Europe
The European version of the escape clause can best be understood in the
broader context of European trade practice toward NMEs. In contrast to U.S.
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practice, Europe has tended to use quotas rather than duties to limit trade.
Although the quotas of the 1930s are illegal within the Community, they
continue to play a role between the EC and its extra-Community trading
partners. The old quotas have largely been reduced and simplified into
Community-wide "liberalization lists". Products on these lists may be im-
ported free of quantitative and similar restrictions. Of 1,010 tariff categories.
892 (or 88%) are now completely liberalized for free market MFN trading
partners [28]. The EC maintains separate liberalization lists for NMEs, how-
ever, particularly Eastern European NMEs. While these lists have also been
expanded, only some 700 headings (or 69%) have been fully liberalized [29].
Unlike the United States, which merely moves NMEs from "column I" to
"column 2" on the tariff schedules when it grants MFN status, the EC has
been slow to eliminate quotas and similar barriers to trade with NMEs that
join the GATT. The trend toward GATT membership among NMEs, however.
has fragmented the EC's lists, leaving the Soviet Union with many more
restrictions than Hungary or Poland, while China has negotiated an entirely
separate liberalization list [30]. But even favored NMEs that have joined the
GATT complain about the slow pace of liberalization, and some have ques-
tioned whether the liberalization process will ever reach products they actually
export. One Hungarian trade representative, for example, saw little to cheer
about in the EC's lifting of restraints on Hungarian coffee or in the prospect
that Hungarian bananas and pineapples might some day soon be free of EC
import limits [31].
Despite these differences between U.S. and EC trade traditions and prac-
tices, their legal frameworks are remarkably similar. Like the United States, for
example, the EC has one set of escape clause rules for NMEs and another for
the rest of the world. And again, like the United States, the differences seem
hardly worth the trouble.
3.1.2.1. Regulation No. 288/82. The rules governing imports into the EC are
updated and reissued from time to time. The latest general rules were adopted
in February 1982 as Regulation No. 288/82. They contain for the first time a
"transparent" Community investigation procedure for determining whether
escape clause relief is warranted. The product of strenuous U.S. lobbying
during the Tokyo Round, these procedures will look familiar to students of the
ITC's procedures in U.S. escape clause proceedings. They include publishing
announcements of escape clause investigations in the EC's Official Journal.
hearing the views of interested parties (except in emergencies), and preserving
the confidentiality of information supplied for escape clause proceedings. The
new rules also list the factors to be considered in deciding whether imports
have injured or threaten to injure domestic industry [32].
The substantive standards the EC applies in granting escape clause relief are
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also similar to U.S. law: imports of a product must be entering "in such
greatly increased numbers and/or on such terms and conditions as to cause, or
threaten to cause, substantial injury to Community producers of like or
directly competing products" [33]. Relief, which in the EC almost always
means quotas, may be granted by a qualified majority of the European Council
based on the proposal of the European Commission [34]. In a critical situation,
the Commission may even act on its own [35].
For situations falling short of these standards but nonetheless requiring at
least the appearance of action, the Council may impose "surveillance". Surveil-
lance is essentially a paperwork requirement that allows the EC to keep track
of the origins, importers, and prices of sensitive imports. Surveillance of a
product may be ordered under Regulation 288/82 whenever "developments in
the market... threaten to cause injury to Community producers of like or
directly competing products" [36].
3.1.2.2. Regulation No. 1765/82. These general rules are modified slightly for
NMEs by Regulation No. 1765/82, which was promulgated on June 30. 1982.
On the one hand this new rule grants NMEs the benefit of the procedural rules
used in other escape clause proceedings. On the other hand the relevant EC
domestic industry is defined somewhat more broadly to include all those
making "like or competing" products rather than "like or directly competing"
products [37]. The Commission is further required "to take into account the
economic system peculiar to State-trading countries" in applying the new
injury standards [38]. Finally, the standard for imposing surveillance is greatly
diluted; instead of a finding that market developments threaten injury to
domestic industry, the Commission need only decide that "Community inter-
ests... require" surveillance of NME imports [39].
As in the United States, there may be less to these differences than meets
the eye. The arguably meaningful distinction between "competing" and "di-
rectly competing" products may prove empty in application. Indeed, if any
difference was originally intended, the EC may have inadvertently elided it
recently by borrowing wholesale from the " traisparent" procedural rules that
apply to free-market imports. The procedural rules, which Regulation No.
1765/82 now makes applicable to NMEs, include a section giving content to
the injury standard; although relief may be granted when "similar or compet-
ing" products are affected, the new procedural section requires the Commis-
sion to focus on "similar or directly competitive products".
By requiring the Commission to consider the peculiarities of NMEs in
determining injury, the rules will no doubt spur imaginative counsel to
emphasize NMEs' theoretical ability to shift masses of products quickly from
the domestic to the export market. This would weigh in favor of a "hair
trigger" injury or threat-of-injury standard. So long as NMEs' ability to move
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nimbly in export markets remains more theoretical than real, however, this
clause may simply be read to state the obvious: when investigating NME
imports, do not forget where they come from.
Finally, while the easy imposition of surveillance opens up substantial room
for petty harassment and excessive paperwork, surveillance alone will not
cause the collapse of a major countertrade deal. Companies doing busifiess
with NMEs long ago learned to live with heavy doses of paperwork and
bureaucratic oversight. Moreover, the NME rules seem to offer somewhat
greater protection against politically motivated harassment by putting the
decision whether to require surveillance in the hands of the independent
Commission, instead of the Council, leaving less opportunity for individual
member countries to impose surveillance on their own or to affect the EC's
decision.
As in the United States, the main danger posed by the escape clause to EC
companies engaged in countertrade is not the modest differences in legal
standards applied to NMEs. It is the ease with which escape clause relief can
be turned to political uses. Nothing in Regulation No. 1765/82 protects
long-term agreements from shifting diplomatic winds. The standards for
granting relief are broad and easily may be interpreted to justify severe
restrictions on existing agreements. The EC is less insulated from political
influences than the ITC in the United States, and the Council's authority over
the final decision is at least as great as the authority of the President and
Congress under section 406. Even the dubious discipline of the GATT is
largely missing, for most NMEs are not members. Although at this point the
EC seems less likely to display the rapid swings that U.S. policy has shown
toward East-West trade, its escape clause rules add little or nothing to the
certainty that large-scale countertrade requires.
3.2. Antidumping and countervailing duties
Perhaps predictability is too much to expect from escape clause provisions.
which are designed to offer practical relief from the certainties of free trade
obligations. Antidumping and countervailing duty laws, on the other hand.
aspire to certainty and claim consistency with free trade principles. In practice.
however, because of fundamental confusion in applying these laws to NMEs.
antidumping and countervailing duty rules pose the same Damoclean threat to
countertrade as escape clause provisions.
Unlike escape clause relief, antidumping and countervailing duties can be
justified as preventing artificial distortions of an international free market [401.
A firm with a domestic monopoly might use its monopoly profits to subsidize
its own exports and destroy foreign competitors despite their comparative
advantage. Antidumping laws prevent such discriminatory export pricing.
Similarly, a firm subsidized by its home government could undercut more
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efficient but unsubsidized foreign rivals. Countervailing duties wipe out such
-unfair" advantages.
That at least is the theory, but the theory assumes free market conditions.
When prices are set by central state planners and scarcities are allocated in
part by such nonmonetary devices as queues, party membership, and the like,
antidumping and countervailing duty concepts become difficult to apply. How
can one locate government subsidies to particular industries when all industries
belong to the government? How can one determine the true domestic price of
goods that are cheap but never in stock? The problem is further complicated
when currency values are set by the state, making meaningful currency
conversions nearly impossible.
3.2.1. GATT
The GATT, which provides the framework for Member States' national
antidumping and countervailing duty laws, recognized early that these laws
would require modification for NMEs. Article VI of the GATT regulates
antidumping and countervailing duty laws. Paragraph I states that dumping is
to be condemned only when sales below "normal value" injure a domestic
industry. Normal value is usually the exporter's home market price: "the
comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when
destined for consumption in the exporting country" [41]. When no home
market price can be found, two other definitions may be adopted: " the highest
comparable price.., for export" to a third country or "the cost of
production... in the country of origin plus a reasonable addition for selling
cost and profit" [42].
In analyzing NME trading practices, however, the possibility of arbitrary
domestic prices makes both home market price and home market cost
meaningless. Only the price charged by an NME in a free-market third country
could have real meaning; but even under the third country price system an
NME would be safe from attack if it dumped in all its foreign markets,
something that is quite possible if the NME is selling to obtain hard currency.
Acknowledging these problems, the GATT added an interpretative note to
Article VI in 1955:
It is recognized that. in the case of imports from a country which has a complete or substantially
complete monopoly of its trade and where all domestic prices are fixed by the State, special
difficulties may exist in determining price comparability for the purposes of paragraph I. and in
such cases importing contracting parties may find it necessary to take into account the possibility
that a strict comparison with domestic prices in such a country may not always be appropriate 1431.
This hesitantly worded note deals only with antidumping laws; it says
nothing about countervailing duties. Indeed, if one may read between the lines,
the GATT's drafters seem to have thrown up their hands at the thought of
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trying to identify individual government subsidies in countries where the
government is the economy. The peculiar result, in the United States at least.
has been that the primary limits on NME trade practices stem from the
antidumping laws, which are designed to stop private unfair trade practices,
rather than the countervailing duty laws which are aimed at government
subsidies. Like the GATT's drafters, U.S. trade officials have flinched from
attacking NME export subsidies directly.
More fundamentally, the note raises two important questions. First, if a
strict comparison with domestic prices is not always appropriate, what replaces
it? Second, which countries does the note cover? One may assume that it
applies to Czechoslovakia, which requested the clarification in 1955 [44], but
what does one do with later NME members of the GATT, particularly
"liberalized" NMEs in which the state does not set all prices?
These questions were answered ad hoc in the negotiations over Poland's
admission to the GATT. The Working Party on Polish accession first noted
that Poland was a country covered by the interpretative note and then
suggested that GATT members might want to substitute a relatively simple test
for the usual domestic price measures. The Working Party suggested asking
whether Polish prices were lower than the importing country's existing market
price or the price charged by manufacturers in a third (presumably free-market)
country:
[Al contracting party may use as the normal value for a product imported from Poland the prices
which prevail generally in its markets for the same or like products or a value for that product
constructed on the basis of the price for a like product originating in another country, so long as
the method used for determining normal value in any particular case is appropriate and not
unreasonable [451.
This ad hoc process continued in other NME accessions and other Working
Party reports, with the result that the interpretative note now clearly covers
Romania [461 and Hungary [47]. Yugoslavia, in contrast, is apparently not
covered by the note [48].
In the Tokyo Round, the question was treated somewhat more comprehen-
sively. Article 2.7 of the GATT's 1979 antidumping code simply retained the
interpretative note, and no effort was made to draw a distinct line between
free-market countries and NMEs. In contrast, Article 5 of the 1979 subsidies
code broke new ground by refining the tests to be used in measuring normal
value for NME exports. The code collapsed antidumping and countervailing
duty standards into a single test: whether the NME's export price was less than
(I) the selling price of like products in another free-market country. (2) the
constructed value of like products in another free-market country. or (3) as a
last resort, the price charged in the importing country (plus reasonable profits
where necessary).
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3.2.2. United States
3.2.2.1. Present law. In the wake of the Tokyo Round. U.S. laws and
regulations were amended to reflect the new antidumping and countervailing
duty codes. While countervailing duty laws were not amended to cover NMEs,
section 773(c) of the amended Tariff Act of 1930 now states a special rule for
determining the domestic value of NME exports in antidumping cases. The
section does not explain which countries are to be considered NMEs; it applies
whenever a country's economy "is State controlled to an extent that sales or
offers of sales of such or similar merchandise in that country or to countries
other than the United States do not permit a determination of foreign market
value" by the usual methods [49]. This is an apparently open-ended standard
that some Western industries would have trouble meeting. Indeed, the United
States found it necessary to offer reassurances that state trading companies in
free-market countries would not be covered [50]. On the other hand, the test
also leaves the administrators enough flexibility to treat Eastern European
nations like free-market countries. In fact, in Truck Trailer Axlesfriom Htngary,
the Commerce Department noted proposed changes in Hungary's economy
and declared that "[t]hese reforms, if adopted as expected, may change the
Hungarian economy sufficiently to establish 'free-market' characterization in
future cases" [51].
The law is, however, reasonably clear in spelling out the surrogates to be
used in measuring NME home-market values. It allows antidumping adminis-
trators either to use the domestic or export prices charged by producers in a
free-market country for similar goods or to use the constructed value of similar
goods produced in a free-market country.
The implementing regulations complicated this scheme by introducing the
notion of comparable economic development. The regulations assume that
prices and costs in poor NMEs cannot fairly be compared to those in rich
free-market countries. Thus, the free-market surrogate must be "at a stage of
economic development comparable" to the NME [52].
What these regulations mean is open to argument. even among the adminis-
trators themselves. One surrogate for NME home market price, however, is
clearly preferred: the price charged in a comparably developed free-market
country. In the absence of suitable prices, antidumping administrators may use
the constructed value of similar goods, but, once again, only goods produced in
a comparably developed free-market country. Even if no comparable country
produces similar goods, the administrators need not abandon the quest for
comparability; they may measure the NME producer's objective, individual
"factors of production" (hours of labor, raw materials, energy, and the like),
price these components in a comparable free-market country, and, by totalling
these factor costs, create a composite indicative of the price which would have
been charged in the free-market country if it produced such a good. This was
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done in the notorious Polish golf cart case, where administrators based their
determination on a study by the Polish exporter, that hypothetically recon-
structed a Polish golf cart factory in Spain, complete with labor force and
supply lines, to determine the Spanish cost of Polish carts [54].
Only if no comparably developed country can be found do the regulations
apparently permit the use of prices and constructed value in "noncomparable"
free-market countries (and even then the rules exclude U.S. prices and costs)
[551. Under this method, prices and costs must be "suitably adjusted for
known differences in the costs of materials and labor" [56], a remarkable
requirement given that one only finds oneself in this part of the rulebook when
cost differences cannot be known. The last option, when all else fails, is to use
the market price established by U.S. manufacturers [57].
Despite this wealth of complex options, one point emerges clearly from
these rules: deciding which free-market country is comparable to which NME
now offers the key to NME antidumping cases. The comparability decision
allows the U.S. Commerce Department to reach the result it chooses by
excluding as not comparable those countries with home-market prices that are
too high (or too low). The only check on this administrative discretion is the
virtually contentless requirement that the Department measure comparability
by resorting to "generally recognized criteria, including per capita gross
national product and infra-structure development (particularly in the industry
producing such or similar merchandise)" [58].
The methodology chosen by the U.S. regulations has serious theoretical
problems. First, there is no good reason to assume that costs in two compara-
bly developed countries are similar. If their costs were similar, comparably
developed countries would have no comparative advantages and no reason to
trade with each other. The volume of trade among such "comparably devel-
oped" partners as the United States. Europe. and Japan suggests that their
economies in fact have very different cost structures. However, even if the
theory of the U.S. regulations were correct for most countries, it would not
work for NMEs. Unlike less-developed free-market countries, a less-developed
NME may draw upon the nation's entire resources to create "export platforms"
highly sophisticated industries that exist exclusively to earn foreign currency.
The industries most comparable to these showpieces may be found only in the
most developed countries [59].
If countertrade flourishes best in an atmosphere of reasonable certainty, the
most significant aspect of the U.S. regulations is the sweeping discretion that
they confer on the administrators of the antidumping laws. This may be
illustrated by another reference to the Polish golf cart case. U.S. administrators
originally used a Canadian manufacturer as a surrogate for the Polish factory
[601. The result was a determination of consistent dumping, with substantial
dumping margins. When the Poles protested, the U.S. State Department took
their side and another surrogate was sought [61]. The results, as described in a
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memorandum of November 29, 1977, from the Commissioner of Customs to
the General Counsel at the Treasury Department, were as follows:
The State Department has conducted a survey in an attempt to find a third country in which the
selling prices of golf carts would be lower than the prices in Canada (which we have used in the
past) or the United States. The results of this survey are not terribly conclusive, but are
summarized as follows:
Italy - $3,000
Japan - $2.850
United Kingdom - $2,328 (uses Polish chassis)
Germany - $2, 635
South Africa - $3,680
The current price being charged by a United States manufacturer of golf carts closely similar to
those produced in Poland is approximately $1,400.
Domestic manufacturers no doubt find it disturbing that the U.S. State
Department set out to find foreign prices which "would be lower than the
prices in Canada... or the United States" so that the Polish manufacturer
could undercut U.S. prices without dumping liability. Equally troubling, when
the administrators could not find such a country, they simply declared that
none of the third countries where golf carts were manufactured had sufficient
sales and turned to an approach now enshrined in the regulations. They
hypothetically moved the Polish factory to Spain, measured the cost of Polish
carts built at Spanish prices, and found no sales below fair value [62]. After
several years of such calculations, the antidumping order was reviewed and
withdrawn [63].
In that case, administrative discretion plainly benefited the NME exporter.
The antidumping laws, it seems, currently function in much the same way as
section 406: largely in favor of NMEs. But this is cold comfort for those who
deal in countertrade, for the history of section 406 shows that advantages won
through administrative discretion may be lost overnight when the political and
diplomatic tides turn.
Awkward as they are in dealing with NME trade generally, U.S. anti-
dumping laws are even less attuned to the peculiarities of countertrade. Take,
for example, a Western firm that signs two counterpurchase contracts with an
Eastern European nation, one contract selling digital electronic watch technol-
ogy and the other buying agricultural products such as poultry. If the Western
firm sells its technology at market value and buys the poultry at a price below
market value, antidumping duties will be imposed on the imported poultry. If
the price of both products is simply increased, however, the Commerce
Department currently has no method of calculating the value of the reciprocal
contract. This clearly demonstrates that the Commerce Department has not
heard Professor Hudec's story about the farmer who, when offered a $1,000
watch by a traveling salesman, responded, "I don't have the cash. Why don't
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you take two $500 chickens?" [64]. It also shows that U.S. antidumping laws
and regulations will require a substantial interpretative overhaul before they
can deal effectively with countertrade.
3.2.2.2. The Heinz bill. A bill designed to reduce the uncertainty associated
with NME trade laws has been introduced by Senator Heinz of Pennsylvania.
The bill, S.958, repeals section 406 and the special antidumping section
applicable only to NMEs [65]. Instead, NME imports challenged as unfair
would be considered on one of two tracks. The case may be treated as an
ordinary antidumping or countervailing duty investigation if the NME pro-
vides sufficient information to do so, including information on "true" ex-
change rates. If sufficient information is not available, the investigation would
proceed like a countervailing duty case, except that the standard of compliance
with the trade laws would be whether the NME is pricing its exports below the
lowest average price charged by a free-market producer - whether U.S. or
foreign.
Assuming that most NMEs will end up on the second track, this approach
has the advantage of relative certainty [66]. Most exporters know what the
competition is charging for its goods and imports from NMEs will be immune
from challenge so long as they stay at or above this level. The bill is
theoretically unfair both to NMEs having the world's most efficient operations
and to competitors more efficient than NME sellers. As a practical matter.
these flaws may make little difference. There are few industries in which NMEs
can claim to be more efficient than any other producer. and such claims will
always be unprovable so long as NME costs cannot be measured. At the same
time. NMEs are unlikely to do much harm to domestic industries so long as
they limit themselves to matching rather than undercutting market prices.
From the point of view of countertrade, however, the Heinz bill would
appear to have at least one drawback. Countertrade goods frequently sell at a
substantial discount, both because of quality problems and because private
firms must be induced to accept products for which they have no established
distribution system. Unless the Heinz bill takes such problems into account,
the prices ordinarily encountered in countertrade may well trigger duties. In
contrast, such discounts apparently will receive favorable treatment under
current U.S. antidumping regulations, which adjust for quality differences.
The Heinz bill has not yet aroused a strong response in Congress and seems
unlikely to pass in the near future. Over the long run. however, it may stand a
reasonably good chance. Those interested in countertrade would do well to
consider whether the increased certainty of the Heinz approach outweighs its
possible impact on pricing flexibility.
3.2.3. Europe
Like the United States, the EC has a special set of antidumping and
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countervailing duty rules for NME imports. The EC's rules are substantially
simpler but no less discretionary. The EC has followed the hint in the 1979
GATT subsidies code that antidumping and countervailing duty rules be
consolidated for NMEs; the EC's 1979 countervailing duty regulations there-
fore simply incorporate the antidumping standards for finding NME sales
below normal value. [67].
The antidumping rules create a special definition of "normal value" for
NME imports:
In the case of imports from non-market economy countries and, in particular, those to 
which
Regulations No. 2532/78 and No. 925/79 apply [i.e. China, Bulgaria, Hungary. Poland, Romania,
Czechoslovakia, East Germany. U.S.S.R., Albania, Vietnam, North Korea and Mongolia], 
normal
value shall be determined in an appropriate and not unreasonable manner on the basis of 
one of
the following criteria:
(a) the price at which the like product of a market economy third country is actually sold:
(i) for consumption on the domestic market of that country, or
(ii)to other countries, including the Community; or
(b) the constructed value of the like product in a market economy third country; or
(c) if neither price nor constructed value as established under (a) or (b) above provides an
adequate basis, the price actually paid or payable in the Community for the like product, duly
adjusted if necessary, to include a reasonable profit margin.
In some respects, these rules, which largely repeat the GATT subsidies code,
are more definite than the U.S. rules. For example, by incorporating a
nonexclusive list of nonmarket economies, the EC's rules reduce guess-work
and administrative agonizing over whether a particular country is an NME.
The EC rules also eschew reliance on economic "comparability" in de-
termining the free-market countries that will be used as surrogates for NMEs.
While this should probably be welcomed because it makes economic sense, it
adds nothing to the rules' certainty of application. Complex though it is, the
U.S. scheme at least provides a hierarchy of tests for NME home-market value
and attempts to reduce (though hardly to eliminate) administrative license to
choose a surrogate that guarantees a particular result. The European rules
make no effort to restrain administrative discretion. Beyond the statement,
required by the GATT, that EC prices will be used only if third country prices
or constructed value do not provide "an adequate basis", the EC's rules
suggest no preference for real prices over constructed value or for domestic
over export prices. No standards are suggested for choosing among possible
surrogate countries. In short, nothing prevents Europe from having its own
Polish golf cart case, with the same result-oriented scouring of the globe for a
proper surrogate.
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